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Abstract—Inhomogeneous random K-out graphs were recently
introduced to model heterogeneous sensor networks secured by
random pairwise key predistribution schemes. First, each of the n
nodes is classified as type-1 (respectively, type-2) with probability
0 < µ < 1 (respectively, 1 − µ) independently from each other.
Next, each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node draws 1 arc towards
a node (respectively, Kn arcs towards Kn distinct nodes) selected
uniformly at random, and then the orientation of the arcs is
ignored. It was recently established that this graph, denoted by
H(n;µ,Kn), is connected with high probability (whp) if and only
if Kn = ω(1). In other words, if Kn = O(1), then H(n;µ,Kn)
has a positive probability of being not connected as n gets large.
Here, we study the size of the largest connected subgraph of
H(n;µ,Kn) when Kn = O(1). We show that the trivial condition
of Kn ≥ 2 for all n is sufficient to ensure that inhomogeneous
K-out graph has a connected component of size n− O(1) whp.
Put differently, even with Kn = 2, all but finitely many nodes
will form a connected sub-network in this model under any 0 <
µ < 1. We present an upper bound on the probability that
more than M nodes are outside of the largest component, and
show that this decays as O(1) exp{−M(1− µ)(Kn − 1)}+ o(1).
Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the size of the
largest connected component when the number of nodes is finite.
Index Terms—Random graphs, connectivity, security
I. INTRODUCTION
Random graph modeling is as an important framework
for developing fundamental insights into the structure and
dynamics of several complex real-world networks including
social networks, economic networks and communication net-
works [1]–[4]. In the context of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs), random graph models have been used widely [5],
[6] in the design and performance evaluation of random key
predistribution schemes that were proposed for ensuring their
secure connectivity [5], [7], [8].
The random K-out graph is one of the earliest models
studied in the literature [9], [10]. Denoted here by H(n;K),
it is constructed as follows. Each of the n nodes draws K
arcs towards K distinct nodes chosen uniformly at random
among all others. The orientation of the arcs is then ignored,
yielding an undirected graph. Random K-out graphs have
received renewed interest for analyzing secure sensor networks
and anonymous routing in cryptocurrency networks. In the
context of wireless sensor networks, random K-out graphs
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have been studied [11]–[14] to model the random pairwise
key predistribution scheme [15]. Along with the original key
predistribution scheme proposed by Escheanuer and Gligor
[5], the pairwise scheme is one of the most widely recognized
security protocols for WSNs. Cryptocurrency networks pro-
vide another application where a structure similar to random
K-out graphs has been proposed to make message propagation
robust to de-anonymization attacks [16, Algorithm 1].
In recent years, the analysis of heterogeneous variants of
classical random graph models has emerged as an important
topic [17]–[22], owing to the fact that real-world network
applications are increasingly heterogeneous with participating
nodes having different capabilities and (security and connec-
tivity) requirements [1], [23]–[26]. A heterogeneous variant
of random K-out graph, known as the inhomogeneous ran-
dom K-out graph, was proposed recently to model networks
secured by heterogeneous random pairwise key predistribu-
tion schemes [17], [18]. In the inhomogeneous random K-
out graph, each node is independently classified as type-1
(respectively, type-2) with probability µ (respectively, 1− µ).
Then, each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node selects one node
(respectively, Kn ≥ 2 nodes) uniformly at random from all
other nodes; see Figure 1. The notation Kn indicates that the
number of selections made by type-2 nodes scales as a func-
tion of the number of nodes n. We denote the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph on n nodes with parameters µ and Kn
as H(n;µ,Kn).
In several real-world networks, connectivity is attributed
to be a fundamental determinant of system performance. It
was established in [9], [11] that random K-out graphs are
connected (respectively, not connected) with high probability
(whp) when K ≥ 2 (respectively, when K = 1); i.e.,
lim
n→∞P [H(n;K) is connected] =
{
1 if K ≥ 2,
0 if K = 1.
(1)
In [17], it was shown that for any 0 < µ < 1, the inhomo-
geneous random K-out graph is connected whp if and only if
Kn grows unboundedly large with n; i.e.,
lim
n→∞P [H(n;µ,Kn) is connected]=
{
1 if Kn →∞
< 1 otherwise.
(2)
As seen from (2), ensuring connectivity of H(n;µ,Kn)
requires Kn = ω(1).
Although it is desirable to have a connected network, in sev-
eral practical applications, resource constraints can potentially
limit the number of links that can be successfully established.
For instance, if the power available for transmission is limited,
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Fig. 1. An inhomogeneous random K-out graph with 6 nodes. Nodes A,C
and E are type-2 and the rest (B,D, F ) are type-1. Each type-1 (resp. type-2)
node selects 1 (resp. Kn = 3) node uniformly at random. An edge is drawn
between two nodes if at least one selects the other.
the underlying physical network may not be dense enough to
guarantee global connectivity with key predistribution schemes
[27]. Depending on the nature of the application, it may
suffice to have a large connected sub-network spanning almost
the entire network [28]. For example, if a sensor network is
designed to monitor temperature of a field, it may suffice to
aggregate readings from a majority of sensors in the field [29].
With this in mind, the question which we address here
is when Kn is bounded (i.e., Kn = O(1)), how many
nodes are contained in the largest connected sub-network
(i.e., component) of H(n;µ,Kn)? In the literature on random
graphs, this is often studied in terms of the existence and size
of the giant component, defined as a connected sub-network
comprising Ω(n) nodes; see [30] for a classical study on the
size of the giant component of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs.
We establish that the inhomogeneous random K-out graph
contains a giant component as long as the trivial conditions
0 < µ < 1 and Kn ≥ 2 (for all n) hold. In fact, we
show under the same conditions that the graph contains a
connected sub-network of size n−O(1) whp. Put differently,
all but finitely many nodes will be contained in the giant
component of H(n;µ,Kn), as n goes to infinity. This is
also demonstrated through numerical experiments where we
observe that with n = 5000, µ = 0.9,Kn = 2, at most
45 nodes turned out to be outside the largest connected
component across 100,000 experiments; see Section III for
details. Our main result follows from an upper bound on the
probability that more than M nodes are outside of the giant
component. We show that this probability decays at least as
fast as O(1) exp{−M(1 − µ)(Kn − 1)} + o(1) providing a
clear trade-off between Kn and the fraction (1− µ) of nodes
that make Kn selections.
We close by describing a potential application of (inho-
mogeneous) random K-out graphs. Given their sparse yet
connected structure, these graphs can be useful for analyzing
payment channel networks (PCNs) wherein edges represent
the funds escrowed in a bidirectional overlay network on top of
the cryptocurrency network [31]. Recent work in the realm of
cryptocurrency networks has closely looked at the topological
properties of PCNs and their impact on the achieved through-
put [32]–[34]. A key aspect of PCNs is the trade-off between
the number of edges in the network (which is constrained
since funds need to be committed on each edge) and its
connectivity (which is desirable so that any pair of nodes can
perform transactions with each other). The results established
here show that the construction of inhomogeneous random K-
out graphs leads to almost all nodes being connected with
each other (as part of the largest connected component) with
relatively small number of edges per node. For instance, with
K = 2 and µ = 0.5, each node will have 3 edges on average.
In fact, the Lightning Network dataset from December 2018
shows that it contains 2273 nodes, of which 2266 are contained
in the largest connected component while the remaining 7
nodes being in three isolated components.
All limits are understood with the number of nodes n going
to infinity. While comparing asymptotic behavior of a pair
of sequences {an}, {bn}, we use an = o(bn), an = ω(bn),
an = O(bn), an = Θ(bn), and an = Ω(bn) with their meaning
in the standard Landau notation. All random variables are
defined on the same probability triple (Ω,F ,P). Probabilistic
statements are made with respect to this probability measure
P, and we denote the corresponding expectation operator by
E. For an event A, its complement is denoted by Ac. We say
that an event occurs with high probability (whp) if it holds
with probability tending to one as n → ∞. We denote the
cardinality of a discrete set A by |A| and the set of all positive
integers by N0. For events A and B, we use A =⇒ B with
the meaning that A ⊆ B.
II. INHOMOGENEOUS RANDOM K-OUT GRAPH
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of vertex labels
and let N−i := {1, 2, . . . , n} \ i. In its simplest form,
the inhomogeneous random K-out graph is constructed on
the vertex set {v1, . . . , vn} as follows. First, each vertex is
assigned as type-1 (respectively, type-2) with probability µ
(respectively, 1 − µ) independently from other nodes, where
0 < µ < 1. Next, each type-1 (respectively, type-2) node se-
lects K1 (respectively, K2) distinct nodes uniformly at random
among all other nodes. For each i ∈ N , let Γn,i ⊆ N−i denote
the labels corresponding to the selections made by vi. Under
the aforementioned assumptions, Γn,1, . . . ,Γn,n are mutually
independent given the types of nodes. We say that distinct
nodes vi and vj are adjacent, denoted by vi ∼ vj if at least
one of them picks the other. Namely,
vi ∼ vj if j ∈ Γn,i ∨ i ∈ Γn,j . (3)
The inhomogeneous random K-out graph is then defined on
the vertices {v1, . . . , vn} through the adjacency condition (3).
More general constructions with an arbitrary number of node
types is also possible [18], and the implications of our results
for such cases is presented in the Appendix.
Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 ≤ K1 < K2.
From (1), it can be seen that the inhomogeneous random
K-out graph will be connected whp if K1 ≥ 2. Therefore,
interesting cases arise for the connectivity and size of the
largest component only when K1 = 1; i.e., when each node
has a positive probability µ of selecting only one other node.
As in [17], we thus assume that K1 = 1 which in turn
implies that K2 ≥ 2. For generality, we let K2 to scale
with (i.e., to be a function of) n and simplify the notation
by denoting the corresponding mapping as Kn. Put differently,
we consider the inhomogeneous random K-out graph, denoted
as H(n;µ,Kn), where each of the n nodes selects one other
3node with probability µ (0 < µ < 1) and Kn other nodes with
probability 1−µ; the edges are then constructed according to
(3). Throughout, we assume that Kn ≥ 2 for all n in line with
the assumption that K2 > K1 = 1. We denote the average
number of selections made by each node in H(n;µ,Kn) by
〈Kn〉. Observe that
〈Kn〉 = µ+ (1− µ)Kn. (4)
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Main Result
It is known from [17] that H(n;µ,Kn) is connected whp
only if Kn = ω(1). A natural question is then to ask what
would happen if Kn is bounded, i.e, when Kn = O(1). It was
shown, again in [17], that H(n;µ,Kn) has a positive probabil-
ity of being not connected in that case. Thus, it is of interest
to analyze whether the network has a connected sub-network
containing a large number of nodes, or it consists merely
of small sub-networks isolated from each other. To answer
this question, we formally define connected components and
then state our main result characterizing the size of the largest
connected component of H(n;µ,Kn) when Kn = O(1).
Definition 3.1 (Connected Components): Nodes v1 and
v2 ∈ N are said to be connected if there exists a path of edges
connecting them. The connectivity of a pair of nodes forms
an equivalence relation on the set of nodes. Consequently,
there is a partition of the set of nodes N into non-empty sets
C1, C2, . . . , Cm (referred to as connected components) such
that two vertices v1 and v2 are connected if and only if there
exists i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for which v1, v2 ∈ Ci; see [35, p. 13].
In light of the above definition, a graph is connected if it
consists of only one connected component. In all other cases,
the graph is not connected and has at least two connected
components that have no edges in between. It is of interest
to analyze the fraction of the nodes contained in the largest
connected component as the number of nodes grows. In
particular, a graph with n nodes is said to have a giant
component if its largest connected component is of size Ω(n).
Let Cmax(n;µ,Kn) denote the set of nodes in the largest
connected component of H(n;µ,Kn). Our main results, pre-
sented below, show that |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = n − O(1) whp.
Namely, H(n;µ,Kn) has a giant component that contains
all but finitely many of the nodes whp. First, we show
that the probability of at least M nodes being outside of
Cmax(n;µ,Kn) decays exponentially fast with M .
Theorem 3.2: For the inhomogeneous random graph
H(n;µ,Kn) with Kn ≥ 2 ∀n and Kn = O(1) we have for
eachM = 1, 2, . . . that
P [|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≤ n−M ]
≤ exp{−M (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))}
1− exp{− (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))} + o(1) (5)
The proof of Theorem 3.2 relies on the connection between
the non-existence of sub-graphs with size exceeding M that
are isolated from the rest of the graph, and the size of the
of largest component being at least n − M . This approach
is inspired by [28] and differs from the branching process
technique typically employed in the random graph literature,
e.g., in the case of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [36, Ch. 4]. The proof
of Theorem 3.2 is presented in Section IV.
Corollary 3.3: For the inhomogeneous K-out random graph
H(n;µ,Kn) withKn ≥ 2 ∀n andKn = O(1) we have
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = n−O(1) whp. (6)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary sequence xn = ω(1). Substitut-
ing M with xn in (5), we readily see that
lim
n→∞P [n− |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≤ xn] = 1. (7)
Namely, we have
n− |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≤ xn whp for any xn = ω(1). (8)
This is equivalent to the number of nodes (n −
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)|) outside the largest connected component
being bounded, i.e., O(1), with high probability. This fact is
sometimes stated using the probabilistic big-O notation, Op.
A random sequence fn = Op(1) if for any ε > 0 there exists
finite integers M(ε) and n(ε) such that P[fn > M(ε)] < ε
for all n ≥ n(ε). In fact, we see from [37, Lemma 3] that (8)
is equivalent to having n − |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = Op(1) Here,
we equivalently state this as
n− |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = O(1) whp,
giving readily (6).
We extend Corollary 3.3 to inhomogeneous random K-out
graphs with arbitrary number of node types; see Appendix.
B. Discussion
Theorem 3.2 shows that for arbitrary 0 < µ < 1 and even
with Kn = 2, the largest connected component in H(n;µ,Kn)
spans n − O(1) nodes whp. We expect that especially in
resource-constrained environments (e.g., IoT type settings), it
will be advantageous to have a large connected component
reinforcing the usefulness of the heterogeneous pairwise key
predistribution scheme for ensuring secure communications in
such applications; see [15], [17] for other advantages of the
(heterogeneous) pairwise scheme.
It is worth emphasizing that the largest connected com-
ponent of H(n;µ,Kn), whose size is given in (6), is much
larger than what is strictly required to qualify it as a giant
component, i.e, the condition that |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = Ω(n).
In fact, for most random graph models, including Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graphs [30] and random key graphs [38, Theorem 2], studies
on the size of the largest connected component are focused
on characterizing the behavior of |Cmax|/n as n gets large;
this amounts to studying the fractional size of the largest
connected component. Our result given at (6) goes beyond
looking at the fractional size of the largest component, for
which it gives |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)|n →p 1. This is equivalent to
having |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = n − o(n). However, even having
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = n − o(n) leaves the possibility that as
many as n0.99 nodes are not part of the largest connected
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Fig. 2. Average and minimum number of nodes contained in the largest
connected component of H(n;µ,Kn) with Kn = 2, n = 1000, 5000 and
µ ∈ {0.1, . . . , 0.9}. Even when µ = 0.9, settingKn = 2 is enough to ensure
that almost all of the nodes form a connected component; at most 45 out of
5000 nodes (or, 60 out of 1000 nodes) are seen to be isolated from the giant
component across 100,000 experiments.
component. Thus, our result, showing that at most O(1) nodes
are outside the largest connected component whp, is sharper
than existing results on the fractional size of the largest
connected component.
Our result highlights a major difference of inhomogeneous
random K-out graphs with classical models such as Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi (ER) graphs [10], [30]. We provide an example to
compare the size of the giant component in H(n;µ,Kn) and
ER graphs with the same mean degree. For H(n;µ,Kn), we
set Kn = 2 and µ = 0.9, which yields a mean node degree of
(1 − o(1))2〈Kn〉 ≈ 2(0.9 + 0.1 × 2) = 2.2; see Appendix.
Let G(n; pn) denote the ER graph on n nodes with edge
probability pn ∈ [0, 1]. We set pn = 2.2/n to get a mean
degree of 2.2. Thus, the mean number of edges in both these
models match. It is known that for pn = c/n and c > 1, the
ER graph has a giant component of size βn(1 + o(1)) whp,
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the solution of β+ e−βc = 1. Substituting
p = 2.2/n, the largest connected component of the ER graph
G(n; 2.2/n) is of size ≈ 0.8437n+o(n) whp. For an ER graph
over 5000 nodes, this corresponds to over 700 nodes being
isolated from the largest component. In contrast, Theorem 3.2
shows that the largest connected component of H(n;µ,Kn)
would be much larger. Namely, Cmax(n;µ,Kn) = n − O(1)
whp. This is verified in our experiments in Figure 2, where
for a network of 5000 nodes, with µ ≤ 0.9, at most 45
nodes are outside the largest connected component in 100,000
experiments.
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Fig. 3. Average and minimum number of nodes contained in the largest
connected component of H(n;µ,Kn) across 100,000 experiments with n =
5000, µ = 0.9 andKn ∈ {2, . . . , 10}.
C. Numerical Results
Through simulations, we examine the size of
Cmax(n;µ,Kn) when the number of nodes is finite.
We first explore the impact of varying the probability µ
of a node being type-1 on the size of the largest connected
component. We generate 100,000 independent realizations of
H(n;µ,Kn) with Kn = 2 for n = 1000 and n = 5000,
varying µ between 0.1 and 0.9 in increments of 0.1. Since,
Theorem 3.2 states that the size of the largest connected
component is n − O(1) whp, we focus on the minimum size
of the largest component observed in 100,000 experiments.
The average size of the largest component is also shown for
comparison in Figure 2. We see that even when the probability
of a node being type-1 is as high as 0.9, setting Kn = 2
suffices to have a connected component spanning almost all
of the nodes. For n = 1000 and 5000, at most 60 and 45 nodes,
respectively, are found to be outside the largest connected
component (Figure 2). The observation that the number of
nodes outside the largest connected component does not scale
with n is consistent with Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3.
The next set of experiments probes the impact of varying
the number Kn of edges pushed by type-2 nodes while µ
is fixed. We generate 100,000 independent realizations of
H(n;µ,Kn) for n = 5000 while keeping µ fixed at 0.9 and
varying Kn between 2 and 10 in increments of 1. Increasing
Kn has an impact similar to decreasing µ and we see in
Figure 3 that both the average and the minimum size of
the largest connected component increases nearly monoton-
ically. Given that increasing Kn (or, decreasing µ) increases
〈Kn〉 in view of (4), this observation is consistent with our
main result given in Theorem 3.2; i.e., with the fact that
P [n− |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| > M ] decays to zero exponentially
with (〈Kn〉 − 1)M .
IV. A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
In this section, we provide a proof sketch for Theorem 3.2.
We start by defining a cut.
Definition 4.1 (Cut): [28, Definition 6.3] Consider a graph
G with the node set N . A cut is defined as a non-empty subset
S ⊂ N of nodes that is isolated from the rest of the graph.
Namely, S ⊂ N is a cut if there is no edge between S and
Sc = N \ S.
5It is clear from Definition 4.1 that if S is a cut, then so is
Sc. It is important to note the distinction between a cut as
defined above and the notion of a connected component given
in Definition 3.1. A connected component is isolated from the
rest of the nodes by Definition 3.1 and therefore it is also a cut.
However, nodes within a cut may not be connected meaning
that not every cut is a connected component.
Let En(µ,Kn;S) denote the event that S ⊂ N is a cut
in H(n;µ,Kn) as per Definition 4.1. The event En(µ,Kn;S)
occurs if no nodes in S pick neighbors in Sc, and no nodes
in S pick neighbors in Sc. Thus, we have
En(µ,Kn;S) =
⋂
i∈S
⋂
j∈Sc
({i 6∈ Γn,j} ∩ {j /∈ Γn,i}) .
Let Z(xn;µ,Kn) denote the event that H(n;µ,Kn) has no
cut S ⊂ N with size xn ≤ |S| ≤ n − xn where x : N0 →
N0 is a sequence such that xn ≤ n/2 ∀n. In other words,
Z(xn;µ,Kn) is the event that there are no cuts in H(n;µ,Kn)
whose size falls in the range [xn, n− xn]. If S is a cut, then
so is Sc (i.e., if there is a cut of size m then there must be a
cut of size n−m), therefore we see that
Z(xn;µ,Kn) =
⋂
S∈Pn: xn≤|S|≤bn2 c
(En(µ,Kn;S))c , (9)
where Pn is the collection of all non-empty subsets of N .
Taking the complement of both sides in 9 and then using a
union bound we get
P [(Z(xn;µ,Kn))c] ≤
∑
S∈Pn:xn≤|S|≤bn2 c
P[En(µ,Kn;S)]
=
bn2 c∑
r=xn
 ∑
S∈Pn,r
P[En(µ,Kn;S)]
 ,
(10)
where Pn,r denotes the collection of all subsets of N with
exactly r elements. For each r = 1, . . . , n, we simplify the
notation by writing En,r(µ,Kn) = En(µ,Kn; {1, . . . , r}).
From the exchangeability of the node labels and associated
random variables, we get
P[En(µ,Kn;S)] = P[En,r(µ,Kn)], S ∈ Pn,r.
Noting that |Pn,r| =
(
n
r
)
, we obtain∑
S∈Pn,r
P[En(µ,Kn;S)] =
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)].
Substituting into (10) we obtain
P [(Z(xn;µ,Kn))c] ≤
bn2 c∑
r=xn
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]. (11)
Our next result presents an upper bound on
P [(Z(M ;µ,Kn))c], i.e, the probability that there exists
a cut with size in the range [M,n−M ] for H(n;µ,Kn).
Proposition 4.2: Consider a scaling K : N0 → N0 such that
Kn ≥ 2 ∀n, Kn = O(1), and µ ∈ (0, 1). It holds that
P [(Z(M ;µ,Kn))c]
≤ exp{−M (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))}
1− exp{− (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))} + o(1). (12)
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is presented in the Appendix.
The succeeding Lemma establishes the relevance of the
event Z(xn;µ,Kn) in obtaining a lower bound for the size of
the largest connected component.
Lemma 4.3: For any sequence x : N0 → N0 such that
xn ≤ bn/3c for all n, we have
Z(xn;µ,Kn) =⇒ |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| > n− xn.
Proof. Assume that Z(xn;µ,Kn) takes place, i.e., there is no
cut in H(n;µ,Kn) of size in the range [xn, n− xn]. Since a
connected component is also a cut, this also means that there
is no connected component of size in the range [xn, n− xn].
Since every graph has at least one connected component, it
either holds that the largest one has size |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| >
n− xn, or that |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| < xn. We now show that it
must be the case that |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| > n − xn under the
assumption that xn ≤ n/3. Assume towards a contradiction
that |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| < xn meaning that the size of each
connected component is less than xn. Note that the union of
any set of connected components is either a cut, or it spans the
entire network. If no cut exists with size in the range [xn, n−
xn], then the union of any set of connected components should
also have a size outside of [xn, n−xn]. Also, the union of all
connected components has size n. Let C1, C2, . . . , Cmax denote
the set of connected components in increasing size order. Let
m ≥ 1 be the largest integer such that ∑mi=1 |Ci| < xn. Since
|Cm+1| < xn, we have
xn ≤
m+1∑
i=1
|Ci| < xn + xn ≤ 2n/3 ≤ n− xn.
This means that ∪m+1i=1 Ci constitutes a cut with size in the
range [xn, n − xn] contradicting the event Z(xn;µ,Kn).
We thus conclude that if Z(xn;µ,Kn) takes place with
xn ≤ n/3, then we must have |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| > n− xn.
We now have all the requisite ingredients for establishing
Theorem 3.2. Substituting xn = M, ∀n in Lemma 4.3
for some finite integer M , we get Z(M ;µ,Kn) =⇒
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| > n − M . Equivalently, we have
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≤ n−M =⇒ Z(M ;µ,Kn)c. This gives
P [|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≤ n−M ] ≤ P [Z(M ;µ,Kn)c] (13)
and we get (5) by using Proposition 4.2 in (13).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This work analyzes the existence and size of the giant
component for the inhomogeneous random K-out graph. In
particular, we prove that whenever Kn ≥ 2, the largest
connected sub-network spans all but finitely many nodes of
the network with high probability. This result complements
the existing results on the connectivity of inhomogeneous
random K-out graphs. An open direction is characterizing
the asymptotic size of the largest connected component of
6homogeneous K-out random graph when K = 1 which is not
known to the best of our knowledge. For the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph with r classes, an explicit bound on
the probability of the number of nodes outside the giant
component exceeding M would also be of interest.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Prof. Giulia Fanti for insightful discussions on
payment channel networks. This work has been supported in
part by the National Science Foundation through grant CCF
#1617934 and and David H. Barakat and LaVerne Owen-
Barakat CIT Dean’s Fellowship (2020).
REFERENCES
[1] S. Boccaletti, V. Latora, Y. Moreno, M. Chavez, and D.-U. Hwang,
“Complex networks: Structure and dynamics,” Physics reports, vol. 424,
no. 4-5, pp. 175–308, 2006.
[2] A. Goldenberg, A. X. Zheng, S. E. Fienberg, E. M. Airoldi et al.,
“A survey of statistical network models,” Foundations and Trends in
Machine Learning, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 129–233, 2010.
[3] M. E. Newman, D. J. Watts, and S. H. Strogatz, “Random graph models
of social networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
vol. 99, no. suppl 1, pp. 2566–2572, 2002.
[4] S. M. Kakade, M. Kearns, L. E. Ortiz, R. Pemantle, and S. Suri, “Eco-
nomic properties of social networks,” in Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, 2005, pp. 633–640.
[5] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, “A key-management scheme
for distributed sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’02.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2002, pp. 41–47. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/586110.586117
[6] O. Yag˘an, “Random graph modeling of key distribution schemes in
wireless sensor networks,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland,
College Park, 2011.
[7] Y. Wang, G. Attebury, and B. Ramamurthy, “A survey of security issues
in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials,
vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 2–23, Second 2006.
[8] Y. Xiao, V. K. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, and M. Galloway, “A survey
of key management schemes in wireless sensor networks,” Computer
Communications, vol. 30, pp. 2314 – 2341, 2007, special issue on
security on wireless ad hoc and sensor networks. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140366407001752
[9] T. I. Fenner and A. M. Frieze, “On the connectivity of random m-
orientable graphs and digraphs,” Combinatorica, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 347–
359, Dec 1982.
[10] B. Bolloba´s, Random graphs. Cambridge university press, 2001,
vol. 73.
[11] O. Yag˘an and A. M. Makowski, “On the connectivity of sensor networks
under random pairwise key predistribution,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 59, no. 9, pp. 5754–5762, Sept 2013.
[12] ——, “Modeling the pairwise key predistribution scheme in the presence
of unreliable links,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 59,
no. 3, pp. 1740–1760, March 2013.
[13] F. Yavuz, J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor, “k-connectivity in random
k-out graphs intersecting erdo˝s-re´nyi graphs,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 3, pp. 1677–1692, 2017.
[14] ——, “Toward k-connectivity of the random graph induced by a pairwise
key predistribution scheme with unreliable links,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 61, no. 11, pp. 6251–6271, 2015.
[15] H. Chan, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,” in Proc. of IEEE S&P 2003, 2003.
[16] G. Fanti, S. B. Venkatakrishnan, S. Bakshi, B. Denby, S. Bhargava,
A. Miller, and P. Viswanath, “Dandelion++: Lightweight cryptocurrency
networking with formal anonymity guarantees,” Proc. ACM Meas. Anal.
Comput. Syst., vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 29:1–29:35, Jun. 2018.
[17] R. Eletreby and O. Yag˘an, “Connectivity of wireless sensor networks
secured by the heterogeneous random pairwise key predistribution
scheme,” in Proc. of IEEE CDC 2018, Dec 2018.
[18] R. Eletreby and O. Yaan, “On the connectivity of inhomogeneous
random k-out graphs,” in 2019 IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT), July 2019, pp. 1482–1486.
[19] X. Du, Y. Xiao, M. Guizani, and H.-H. Chen, “An effective key man-
agement scheme for heterogeneous sensor networks,” Ad Hoc Networks,
vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 24–34, 2007.
[20] R. Eletreby and O. Yag˘an, “k-connectivity of inhomogeneous random
key graphs with unreliable links,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 65, no. 6, pp. 3922–3949, June 2019.
[21] ——, “Connectivity of wireless sensor networks secured by hetero-
geneous key predistribution under an on/off channel model,” IEEE
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 2018.
[22] O. Yag˘an, “Zero-one laws for connectivity in inhomogeneous random
key graphs,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 62, no. 8,
pp. 4559–4574, Aug 2016.
[23] A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random net-
works,” science, vol. 286, no. 5439, pp. 509–512, 1999.
[24] K. Lu, Y. Qian, M. Guizani, and H.-H. Chen, “A framework for a
distributed key management scheme in heterogeneous wireless sensor
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 7,
no. 2, pp. 639–647, February 2008.
[25] C.-H. Wu and Y.-C. Chung, “Heterogeneous wireless sensor network
deployment and topology control based on irregular sensor model,” in
Advances in Grid and Pervasive Computing, 2007, pp. 78–88.
[26] M. Yarvis, N. Kushalnagar, H. Singh, A. Rangarajan, Y. Liu, and
S. Singh, “Exploiting heterogeneity in sensor networks,” in Proceed-
ings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies., vol. 2, March 2005, pp. 878–890 vol. 2.
[27] J. Hwang and Y. Kim, “Revisiting random key pre-distribution schemes
for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop
on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks. ACM, 2004, pp. 43–52.
[28] A. Mei, A. Panconesi, and J. Radhakrishnan, “Unassailable sensor
networks,” in Proc. of the 4th International Conference on Security and
Privacy in Communication Netowrks, ser. SecureComm ’08. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2008.
[29] X. Liu, “Coverage with connectivity in wireless sensor networks,” in
2006 3rd International Conference on Broadband Communications,
Networks and Systems. IEEE, 2006, pp. 1–8.
[30] P. Erdo˝s and A. Re´nyi, “On the evolution of random graphs,” Publ.
Math. Inst. Hung. Acad. Sci, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 17–60, 1960.
[31] J. Poon and T. Dryja, “The bitcoin lightning network: Scalable off-chain
instant payments,” 2016.
[32] I. A. Seres, L. Gulya´s, D. A. Nagy, and P. Burcsi, “Topological
analysis of bitcoin’s lightning network,” CoRR, vol. abs/1901.04972,
2019. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1901.04972
[33] W. Tang, W. Wang, G. Fanti, and S. Oh, “Privacy-utility tradeoffs in
routing cryptocurrency over payment channel networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1909.02717, 2019.
[34] V. Sivaraman, S. B. Venkatakrishnan, K. Ruan, P. Negi, L. Yang,
R. Mittal, M. Alizadeh, and G. Fanti, “High throughput cryptocurrency
routing in payment channel networks,” 2018.
[35] J. A. Bondy, U. S. R. Murty et al., Graph theory with applications.
Macmillan London, 1976, vol. 290.
[36] R. Van Der Hofstad, Random graphs and complex networks. Cambridge
university press, 2016, vol. 1.
[37] S. Janson, “Probability asymptotics: notes on notation,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1108.3924, 2011.
[38] K. Rybarczyk, “Diameter, connectivity, and phase transition of the
uniform random intersection graph,” Discrete Mathematics, vol. 311,
no. 17, pp. 1998–2019, 2011.
[39] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor, “k-connectivity in random key
graphs with unreliable links,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 61, no. 7, pp. 3810–3836, July 2015.
[40] K. Rybarczyk, “Sharp threshold functions for random intersection graphs
via a coupling method,” the electronic journal of combinatorics, vol. 18,
no. 1, p. 36, 2011.
[41] J. Zhao, O. Yag˘an, and V. Gligor, “On connectivity and robustness in
random intersection graphs,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 62, no. 5, pp. 2121–2136, May 2017.
APPENDIX
VI. A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.2
A. Useful Facts
For 0 ≤ x < 1 and for a sequence y = 0, 1, 2 . . . , we have
1− xy ≤ (1− x)y ≤ 1− xy + 1
2
x2y2. (14)
7A proof of (14) can be found in [39, Fact 2]. For all x ∈ R,
we have
1± x ≤ e±x. (15)
For 0 ≤ m ≤ n1 ≤ n2, m, n1, n2 ∈ N0,(
n1
m
)(
n2
m
) = m−1∏
i=0
(
n1 − i
n2 − i
)
≤
(
n1
n2
)m
. (16)
From [17, Fact 4.1], we have that for r = 1, 2, . . . , bn2 c,(
n
r
)
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n− r
)n−r
. (17)
B. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof.
In view of (11), the proof for Proposition 4.2 will follow
upon showing
bn/2c∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤ exp{−M (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))}
1− exp{− (〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))} + o(1). (18)
We have(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
=
(
n
r
)(
µ
(
n− r − 1
n− 1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
n−r−1
Kn
)(
n−1
Kn
) )n−r
·
(
µ
(
r − 1
n− 1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
r−1
Kn
)(
n−1
Kn
))r
≤
(
n
r
)(
µ
(
1− r
n− 1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n− 1
)Kn)n−r
·
(
µ
(
r − 1
n− 1
)
+ (1− µ)
(
r − 1
n− 1
)Kn)r
(19)
≤
(
n
r
)(
µ
(
1− r
n
)
+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn)n−r
·
(
µ
( r
n
)
+ (1− µ)
( r
n
)Kn)r
≤
(n
r
)r ( n
n− r
)n−r (
1− r
n
)n−r ( r
n
)r
·
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)n−r
·
(
µ+ (1− µ)
( r
n
)Kn−1)r
(20)
=
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)n
·
 µ+ (1− µ)
( r
n
)Kn−1(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)

r
≤
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)n
(21)
where (19) uses (16), (20) follows from (17) and (21) is plain
from the observation that r/n ≤ 1/2.
We divide the summation in (18) into two parts depending
on whether r exceeds n/log n. The steps outlined below
can be used to upper bound the summation in (18) for an
arbitrary splitting of the summation indices.
bn/2c∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)] =
bn/ lognc∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
+
bn/2c∑
r=bn/ lognc
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)].
(22)
We first upper bound each term in the summation with
indices in the range M ≤ r ≤ bn/ log nc.
Range 1: M ≤ r ≤ bn/ log nc
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)n
(23)
=
(
1− (1− µ)
(
1−
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1))n
(24)
For r ≤ bn/ log nc, we have rn = o(1). Using Fact (14) with
x = rn we get(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤
(
1− (1− µ)
(
1−
(
1− r(Kn − 1)
n
+
r2(Kn − 1)2
2n2
)))n
=
(
1− (1− µ)r(Kn − 1)
n
(
1− r(Kn − 1)
2n
))n
Using r ≤ n/ log n, (15) and that Kn = O(1), we obtain,
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤
(
1− (1− µ)r(Kn − 1)
n
(
1− (Kn − 1)
2 log n
))n
≤ exp
{
−(1− µ)r(Kn − 1)
(
1− (Kn − 1)
2 log n
)}
(25)
= exp {−r(1− µ)(Kn − 1) (1− o(1))} (26)
= exp {−r(〈Kn〉 − 1) (1− o(1))} . (27)
Next, we upper bound the second term in the summation (22)
with indices in the range bn/ log nc+ 1 ≤ r ≤ bn/2c.
Range 2: bn/ log nc+ 1 ≤ r ≤ bn/2c
Observe that(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)] ≤
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
)Kn−1)n
8≤
(
µ+ (1− µ)
(
1− r
n
))n
(28)
=
(
1− r
n
(1− µ)
)n
≤ exp (−r(1− µ)) , (29)
where (29) follows from noting that Kn ≥ 2 and (28) is a
consequence of (15). Finally, we use (27) and (29) in (22) as
follows.
bn/2c∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
=
bn/ lognc∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
+
bn/2c∑
r=bn/ lognc+1
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤
bn/ lognc∑
r=M
e−r(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1)) +
bn/2c∑
r=bn/ lognc+1
e−r(1−µ)
≤
∞∑
r=M
e−r(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1)) +
∞∑
r=bn/ lognc+1
e−r(1−µ)
Observe that both of the above geometric series have all terms
strictly less than one, and thus they are summable. This gives
bn/2c∑
r=M
(
n
r
)
P[En,r(µ,Kn)]
≤ e
−M(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1))
1− e−(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1)) +
e−(1−µ)
n
logn
1− e−(1−µ)
=
e−M(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1))
1− e−(〈Kn〉−1)(1−o(1)) + o(1).
C. Mean node degree in H(n;µ,Kn)
The probability that node i picks node j where i, j ∈ N
depends on the type of node i and is given by
P[j ∈ Γn,i] = µ 1
n− 1 + (1− µ)
Kn
n− 1 =
〈Kn〉
n− 1 . (30)
Let i ∼ j denote the event that node i can securely
communicate with node j.
P[i ∼ j] = 1− (1− P[i ∈ Γn,j ])(1− P[j ∈ Γn,i]),
= 1−
(
1− 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
,
=
2〈Kn〉
n− 1 −
( 〈Kn〉
n− 1
)2
. (31)
Consequently, the mean degree of node i, when Kn = o(n)
is (1− o(1))2〈Kn〉.
D. Inhomogeneous random K-out graph with r classes
Here, each node belongs to type-i independently with prob-
ability µi for i = 1, . . . , r and
∑r
i=1 µi = 1. Each type-i
nodes gets paired with Ki,n other nodes, chosen uniformly
at random from among all other nodes where 1 ≤ K1,n <
K2,n < . . . < Kr,n. Let Kn denote [K1,n,K2,n, . . . ,Kr,n]
and µ = [µ1, µ2, . . . , µr] with µi > 0.
Corollary 6.1: If Kr,n ≥ 2 ∀n then for the inhomogeneous
random K-out graph H (n;µ,Kn) with r node types, we have
|Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| = n−O(1) whp.
Proof. The proof involves showing the existence of a coupling
between the graphs H(n;µ,Kn) and H(n;µ,Kn) such that
the edge set of H(n;µ,Kn) is contained in the edge set of
H(n;µ,Kn). For any monotone-increasing property P , i.e., a
property which holds upon addition of edges to the graph (see
[40, p. 13], [41]) we have
P[H(n;µ,Kn) has property P]
≥ P[H(n;µ,Kn) has property P] (32)
It is plain that the property |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≥ n − M is
monotone increasing upon edge addition. Therefore, if there
exists a coupling under which H(n;µ,Kn) is a spanning
subgraph of H(n;µ,Kn); i.e., if we can generate an instan-
tiation of H(n;µ,Kn) by adding edges to an instantiation of
H(n;µ,Kn), then we can use (32) to establish this Corollary.
Let µ˜ denote
∑r−1
i=1 µi. Consider an instantiation of an inho-
mogeneous random graph H(n; µ˜,Kr,n) with two classes such
that each of the n nodes is independently assigned as type-1
(resp., type-2) with probability µ˜ (resp., 1− µ˜) and then type-
1 (resp., type-2) nodes draw edges to 1 (resp. Kr,n) nodes
chosen uniformly at random. From this instantiation, we can
generate an instantiation of H(n;µ,Kn) as follows. First, let
each type-1 node be independently reassigned as type-i with
probability µiµ˜ for i = 1, 2, . . . , r−1. Next, for i = 2, . . . , r−1,
let each type-i node pick Ki,n − 1 additional neighbors that
were not chosen by it initially. Next, we draw an undirected
edge between each pair of nodes where at least one picked the
other. Clearly, this process creates a graph whose edge set is a
superset of the edge set of the realization of H(n; µ˜,Kr,n) that
we started with. In addition, in the new graph, the probability
of a node picking Ki,n other nodes (i.e., being type-i) is given
by µ˜µiµ˜ = µi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We thus conclude that the
new graph obtained constitutes a realization of H(n;µ,Kn).
Since, the initial realization of H(n; µ˜,Kr,n) was arbitrary, this
establishes the desired coupling argument and we conclude
that (32) holds for the property |Cmax(n;µ,Kn)| ≥ n−M .
